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探索 WTO 报复机制的改革路径。  
全文共分四章。  





























The establishment of retaliation mechanism in WTO has been considered 
as one of the greatest accomplishments in the history of multilateral trade 
negotiations. Retaliation, as the last resort of execution, significantly 
strengthened the execution mechanism of WTO, and the retaliation mechanism 
has been applied much more frequently in WTO dispute settlement. However, 
the effect of retaliation is largely related to the economic power of the winning 
party. Due to the lack of retaliation capacity, developing countries are hard to 
achieve their goals and could even harm their national economy by 
implementing retaliation.  
According to empirical study on actual cases of cross-agreement 
retaliation in WTO and theoretical screening of provisions relating to WTO 
retaliation mechanism and specifically the cross-agreement retaliation, this 
paper manages to discuss the explanations which arbitrators made for 
cross-agreement retaliation practices, and makes comments on the efficacy of 
cross-agreement retaliation by reviewing the implementation of losing parties. 
Finally, it provides some possible approaches of reform in terms of WTO 
retaliation mechanism.      
The paper is structured as four chapters.  
The first chapter covers the whole story from the first introduction in 
GATT to the establishment of WTO retaliation mechanism. Provisions of the 
legal procedure of WTO retaliation mechanism are introduced, and afterwards 
more rigorous procedural issues and substantive issues of cross-agreement 
retaliation are analyzed.  
The second chapter places the emphasis on the suspension of TRIPS 
agreement obligations. Three relevant cases are studied, which are EC-Bananas, 
US-Gambling and US-Upland Cotton. According to the explanations the 
arbitrators gave out for the authorization of cross-agreement retaliation, the 
practice standard of review is concluded. 
Bases on the outcomes of the second chapter, the third chapter 














controversy of the efficacy of cross-agreement retaliation is presented. The 
rationality of cross-agreement retaliation is affirmed, while the limitations of 
which is also pointed out. 
The last chapter illustrates the problems, mainly the procedural problem 
and the matter of efficacy, which has been revealed in current stage. Bases on 
the proposals the member country raised, some practical ways to improve the 
cross-agreement retaliation mechanism are discussed.  
 

















DSB:    Dispute Settlement Body 
         争端解决机构 
DSU:    Understanding on rules and procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes 
         关于争端解决规则和程序的谅解书  
GATT：  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
         关税和贸易总协定 
SCM：   Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
         补贴与反补贴措施协议 
TRIPS ：  Agreement On Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Right 
         与贸易有关的知识产权协定 
WTO：   World Trade Organization 
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[1] European-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas (EC-BananasⅢ)  
Decision by the Arbitrators, WT/DS27/ARB, 9 April 1999. 
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European Communities 
Report of the Panel, WT/DS165/R, 17 July 2000. 
[3] United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services 
Decision by the Arbitrator, WT/DS285/ARB, 21 December 2007. 
[4] United States – Section 306 of the Trade Act of 1974 and 
Amendments Thereto  
Request for Consultations by the European Communities, 
WT/DS200/1, 13 June 2000.  
[5] United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton 
Decision by the Arbitrator, WT/DS267/ARB/1, WT/DS267/ARB/2, 
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其与 WTO 相关规则不符的措施，因此受到相当高的评价。截至 2013 年 4





















                                                 
① Current Status of Disputes, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_current_status_e.htm. 
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第一章  WTO 争端解决机制中的报复机制 
第一节   报复机制概述 
一、争端解决机制的历史沿革 
WTO 中的报复机制是 WTO 争端解决机制中的一部分，WTO 争端解决
机制是在关税和贸易总协定(GATT)的基础上发展起来的。原 GATT 只是一
个临时性的多边贸易协定，并没有专门的争端解决机构和系统的争端解决




进并加强 GATT 争端解决机制的呼声越来越高，WTO 的争端解决机制就是
在这种情况下诞生的。  






(Understanding on rules and procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputed，



























从 1948 年至 1994 年的 48 年间，GATT 历史上只发生过一起获得授权
的报复案，即 1952 年的荷兰乳制品案（Netherlands—Diary Product）。在
该案中，荷兰作为胜诉方要求缔约方全体授权对美国进行报复。在美国、
荷兰均弃权的情况下，缔约方全体通过协商一致，认定美国限制进口荷兰
















                                                 
① SHADIKHOJAEV, SHERZOD. Retaliation in the WTO Dispute Settlement System[M]. Kluwer Law 
International, 2009.60-61. 
② European Economic Community – Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and 













WTO 争端解决中的跨协定交叉报复——以中止 TRIPS 协定项下义务作为交叉报复措施为重点的分析 
4 
贸易壁垒。 
贸易报复，在 DSU 中准确的法律用语是 “中止减让或其他义务 ”
（suspension of concessions or other obligations），即一成员中止对特定成员
方适用自己先前所承诺的减让或其他义务；在《补贴与反补贴措施协议》
（Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures，以下简称“SCM”）
中使用的是“适当的反措施”（appropriate countermeasures），也是同样的涵
义。在 WTO 争端解决机制中，如果败诉方没有在“合理期限”内执行 DSB
的裁决，或争端各方没有就补偿问题达成协议，胜诉方可向 DSB 申请授权
其对败诉方中止依照所适用协议应承担的减让或其他义务，即开始实施所
谓的报复。这是 DSB 允许的最后救济手段。  
与 GATT 的相关条款相比，WTO 中的报复取得了很大进步，主要体现































Degree papers are in the “Xiamen University Electronic Theses and Dissertations Database”. Full
texts are available in the following ways: 
1. If your library is a CALIS member libraries, please log on http://etd.calis.edu.cn/ and submit
requests online, or consult the interlibrary loan department in your library. 
2. For users of non-CALIS member libraries, please mail to etd@xmu.edu.cn for delivery details.
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
